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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
TORTS - DEFAMATION - PRIVILEGE OF REPORTING
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Roxie Henry, in a false oral statement to an assistant district
attorney, accused plaintiff of theft. This defamatory statement
was incorporated in an affidavit by the district attorney's office
and a copy given to defendant's agent by Henry's counsel. De-
fendant newspaper published the statement, and plaintiff brought
a libel action against the newspaper. Defendant did not plead
truth as a defense but claimed the article was the report of a
judicial proceeding and was therefore privileged. Trial court
rendered judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal, held: affirmed.
The qualified privilege afforded the reporting of a judicial pro-
ceeding does not extend to charges made, in an affidavit, to a
prosecutor if no further action has been taken on those charges.'
Based upon the premise that every citizen is entitled to know
how his government is being managed, there is a generally recog-
nized privilege to publish true and accurate reports of legislative,
executive, and judicial proceedings.2 With respect to that phase
of the more general privilege which permits the non-malicious
reporting of judicial proceedings, its reason for existence is to
enable the citizenry to evaluate how well their judges are han-
dling the work of judicial administration.3 Consequently it has
been frequently held that the privilege extends only to those
phases of judicial administration which demand action on the
part of the judge, although it includes ex parte proceedings. 4
More recently a line of cases has developed in which the term
"judicial proceeding" has been expanded to include steps in the
process which do not require action on the part of the judge.;
Dissatisfied with what it termed "a rule of privacy in relation to
litigation that no longer has substance . . . ,"6 the New York
1. Pittsburgh Courier Pub. Co. v. Lubore, 200 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir. 1952),
affirming 101 F. Supp. 234 (D.D.C. 1952).
2. PRoSSER, TORTs 844 (1st ed. 1941).
3. Id. at 845.
4. Peck v. Wakefield Item Co., 280 Mass. 451, 183 N.E. 70 (1932);
Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392 (1884); Park v. Detroit Free Press Co.,
72 Mich. 560, 40 N.W. 731 (1888); Barber v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 3 lo.
App. 377 (1877) ; Fitch v. Daily News Pub. Co., 116 Neb. 474, 217 N.W. 947
(1928); American Publishing Co. v. Gamble, 115 Tenn. 663, 90 S.W. 1005(1906); Ilsley v. Sentinel Co., 133 Wis. 20, 113 N.W. 425 (1907). See
PRossER, TORTS 845, 846 (1st ed. 1941).
5. Glenn v. Gibson, 75 Cal. App. 2d 649, 171 P.2d 118 (1946) ; Kurata v.
Los Angeles News Publishing Co., 80 Cal. App. 537, 40 P.2d 520 (1935).
6. Campbell v. New York Evening Post, 245 N.Y. 320, 324, 157 N.E.
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Court of Appeals held, in Campbell v. New York Evening Post/
that the privilege extended to the publication of defamatory
material contained in a filed pleading but on which no judicial
action had been taken. Thrusting aside the argument that such
a rule may permit the airing of personal malice with impunity,
the court pointed out that many law-suits are dropped prior to
verdict but after some judicial act has been done, situations in
which the person bringing the suit gets just the opportunity to
vilify publicly which is objected to in the instant case. Finally,
recognition was given by the court to the fact that newspaper
publishers do not as a matter of practice distinguish between
defamatory matter in a pleading and that in ex parte proceedings,
for example. Practicality, logic, and consistency were said to
join together to demand this result. Later cases adopting the
rationale of the Campbell case have bolstered the position there
taken by pointing out that while the rule does give an opportu-
nity to get slanderous material before the public, the same result
could be reached under the older rule simply by the device of
moving to amend the complaint. This demands judicial action if
only to deny the motion, and so the privilege attaches.8
While granting the essentiality of giving publicity to the work-
ing of our courts, many cases have declined to follow the lead
of the New York Court of Appeals in extending the privilege2
Reasoning that it is not the duty of newspapers to publish accu-
sations made by one party against another, these courts have
rejected the importance of removing from the newspaper busi-
ness that additional degree of inconvenience and uncertainty
attendant upon the stricter rule. The "small additional risk of
harm to maligned individuals"1 is thought to outweigh the re-
153, 156 (1927). It is interesting to note that the New York court expressed
a similar attitude toward the right of privacy in the case of Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). They held
that the "right of privacy" had not found its place in our jurisprudence.
7. 245 N.Y. 320, 157 N.E. 153 (1927).
8. Paducah Newspaper Inc. v. Bratcher, 274 Ky. 220, 118 S.W.2d 178(1938) (Filing of petition in office of clerk of court causing summons to be
issued); Lybrand v. The State Co., 179 S.C. 208, 184 S.E. 58ff (1936) (Filing
of complaint with court clerk and summons issued).
9. Maloff v. Post Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 279, 28 N.E.2d 458 (1940);
Thompson v. Boston Pub. Co., 285 Mass. 344, 189 N.E. 210 (1934); Peck
v. Wakefield Item Co., 280 Mass. 451, 183 N.E 70 (1932); Fitch v. Daily
News Pub. Co., 116 Neb. 474, 217 N.W. 947 (1928).
10. Sanford v. Boston Herald Travelers Corporation, 318 Mass. 156, 158,
61 N.E.2d 5, 7 (1945).
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duction in inconvenience to a newspaper enterprise which ought
to bear the risk of paying damages if accusations prove false.11
Thus these courts have failed to find any reason for extending the
privilege beyond the limits imposed by the original and, in their
minds, continuing reason for its existence. It is submitted that
although the courts which have extended the privilege to cover
filed pleadings have abolished certain seemingly artificial dis-
tinctions, in doing so they have lost sight of the only reason for
the existence of the privilege; they have sacrificed too much to
gain too little.
In any event, however, it was not necessary for the court in the
principal case to choose between the competing doctrines. In all
the cases which follow the Campbell case there has been a plead-
ing or complaint of some type filed with the court clerk.12 In no
instance was there a mere affidavit given to a prosecutor and no
further action taken as in the principal case. Although affidavits
given in open court have been held to be a type of judicial pro-
ceeding and therefore privileged,13 this privilege has not been
extended to the reporting of an affidavit which may possibly be
used in a judicial proceeding but which has not yet been so used.14
To extend the meaning of judicial procedure to the extent of
including a statement given to a prosecutor before any action is
taken to put the wheels of the judicial body into motion is de-
feating the purpose for which the privilege was intended.", In
view of their definitions of "judicial proceedings" in malicious
prosecution cases, it is questionable whether even the courts of
11. Ibid.
12. See note 8 supra.
13. Stalow v. Hearst Corp., 105 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
14. Bibb v. Crawford, 6 Ga. App. 145, 64 S.E. 488 (1909).
15. Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884). Holmes, J., stated the
purpose of such a privilege as follows:
It is desirable that the trial of causes should take place under
public eye, not because the controversies of one citizen with another
are public concern, but it is of the highest moment that those who
administer justice should always act under the sense of public responsi-
bility, and that every citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his
own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is pe ormed.
If these are not the only grounds upon which fair ieports of judicial
proceedings are privileged, all will agree that they are not the least
important ones. And it is clear that they have no application whatever
to contents of a preliminary written statement of a claim or charge ..
Knowledge of them throws no light upon administration of justice.
Both form and contents depend wholly on the will of a private indi-
vidual, who may not be even an officer of the court. ...
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New York would extend the privilege of reporting judicial pro-
ceedings to a mere affidavit without more decisive action being
taken upon it.1e
Since under neither of the above-discussed doctrines could the
mere filing of an affidavit with a prosecuting attorney be con-
sidered a step in a judicial proceeding, it is clear that the decision
in the principal case was correct.17
16. Losi v. Natalicchio, 112 N.Y.S.2d 706, 708 (Sup. Ct. 1952):
[A]n investigation conducted by the District Attorney's office is not ajudicial proceeding." Schulman v. Modern Industrial Bank, 36 N.Y.S.2d
591, 594 (Sup. Ct. 1942): "As to the investigation conducted by the district
attorney by reason of the defendant's complaint to him no cause of action
arises in consequence. An action for malicious prosecution imports that there
was a judicial proceeding commenced which terminated favorably to the
defendant." It is to be noted that both cases cited the Campbell case.
17. It is interesting to note that the decision was further justified by
the fact that defendant did not expressly or satisfactorily imply in its
publication that the statement had been given to a prosecutor. This ground
for the denial of a qualified privilege is supported by the following cases:
Hughes v. Washington Daily News Co., 193 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1952);
Lewis v. Hayes, 165 Cal. 527; 132 Pac. 1022 (1913); Wood v. Construction
Pub. Co., 57 Ga. App. 123, 194 S.E. 760 (1937), aff'd, 187 Ga. 377, 20 S.E.
131 (1938); Storey v. Wallace, 60 Ill. 51 (1871).
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